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  Michael J. Kowalski

Abstract
An appreciation of the tension between the predicate, "to
curate," and the subject, "the curator," is essential to
understanding the convergence of creation, criticism, and
administration in the graphic arts of our time. Curators were
ideally positioned to step to the fore when the idea-versusobject dichotomy began to collapse in the work of Duchamp.
The roots of activist curating can be found in Western Classical
culture. The prevalence of conceptual art at the end of the
twentieth century, combined with the explicit denigration of
physical craft by artists, created a void into which activist
curators moved. The curator's role as educator and referee in
artistic style wars needs to be reexamined in light of
contemporary analyses of the nature of power. Our
understanding of the nexus of art-making, criticism, and
curating is profoundly compromised by our skill in suppressing
the many pious fictions upon which these activities are
founded.      
Key Words
art education, Bourdieu, conceptual art, criticism, curate,
curator, Denon, flâneur, Großausstellung, Hegel, idea-versusobject, Kant, Kuh, the Louvre, medieval icon, Montaigne,
museum, Pascal, power, Rancière, Reynolds, Szeemann,
"Wack!" exhibition

1. Introduction
Pity the beleaguered museum curator. Mired in administration,
fighting scholarly turf wars, courting egomaniacal benefactors
and collectors, and attempting to infuse critical heft into the
next blockbuster show, how does she find time to respond to
the reconstitution of her profession as an art form open to
every gifted flâneur with a knack for designing brochures?
An appreciation of the tension between the predicate, "to
curate," and the subject, "the curator," is essential to
understanding the convergence of creation, criticism, and
administration in the graphic and conceptual arts of our time.
An allergic response to the verbal form is now quite
common.[1] Contrary to the implications of current usage, the
traditional curator did not curate. For a traditional, custodial
curator such as the late Katherine Kuh,[2] the predicate form
implied a cavalierly stipulative, frankly creative role that
incited "freelance novices to claim a professionalism sadly
lacking, not unlike a first-year intern posing as an experienced
surgeon."[3]
The "freelance novice" is an easy target and, in most cases, a
straw man. The dilettante who's given an opportunity to
curate is the product of a profound shift in the definition not
only of the curator but of the artist and the critic. A far
worthier target of Kuh's professional jealousy would have been
her learned near-contemporary, Harald Szeemann, a

champion of conceptual art, director of Documenta and two
Venice Biennales, and an art star in his own right, "who took
the art outsiders and made them insiders, making the
uncollectible collectible and placing value on thought."[4]  
Like Kuh, Szeemann was largely self-invented, a polymath
who defined the role of curator by integrating his personal mix
of talents into the museum culture of his time. By 1970 that
museum culture was itself undergoing an evolution, a
movement away from the brick-and-mortar institution toward
a notion of the virtual museum: an ideology of the
presentation of works, a new consensus grounded in the
history of the grand edifice on the boulevard but freed from its
physical constraints, if not its social context. In this respect
Szeemann's career, following on the heels of Kuh's tenure at
Chicago by roughly a generation, did not represent a
wholesale rejection of the key components of her definition of
the curator. It was in many respects a reaction to changing
circumstances, a tactical reordering of priorities, a
recalibration of the relative weights of the critical, scholarly,
administrative, and educational elements of the curator's
mission.
Since the curator has traditionally occupied the strategic
ground where the theory of the critic meets the praxis of the
art maker, the curator was ideally positioned to step to the
fore when the idea-versus-object dichotomy began to collapse
in the work of Duchamp. The ground had been well prepared;
the roots of Szeemann's activist curating can be found in
Western culture going back to the pre-Socratics. The custodial
model of curating and the activist model of curating are not
clearly opposed. The fortunes of each point of view wax and
wane as the focus of Western culture oscillates between
word/idea and object/act. The history of this oscillation in the
West is at least as complex and rich in paradox as the
polemical history of iconoclasm. In order to understand the
evolution of curating in the twentieth century, we need to
review the history of strained relations between art makers
and art philosophers. My primary focus in this article will be on
the evolution of curating in the last two hundred years, but I
shall begin much earlier. A brief survey of the roots of activist
curating yields unexpected fruit: there have been several
provocative analogs to the aesthetic ferment of our own time
in the more distant history of Western art, particularly in the
theological art controversies of the early institutional Christian
church.
2. The Roots of Activist Curating
The curator plays priest to the critic's theologian. This may be
a truism but, as in the case of so many apparently banal
metaphors, the entailments are far from trivial and often
overlooked. Whether the entailments of this particular cliché
are overlooked willfully is not the issue. The entailments of the
priestly metaphor need to be examined for the simple reason
that they have a great deal to teach us about the unending
discourse of crisis that gives so much of contemporary artwriting and art-making the whiff of a hoax. I hope to shed
some light on these entailments.
The roles of priest and critic are highly fungible in practice.
The curator and the critic may be one and the same. The

crucial point is that positing theories about the meaning of a
body of artifacts can, and often does, precede the instantiation
of those theories into collections and their manifestation as
exhibitions. In order to understand the professional habitus of
the contemporary activist curator, we need to consider the
long and complex history of the tension in Western art
between the idea and the object, between the verbal and
nonverbal act.
Much of what is loosely described as the progress of Western
civilization can be understood as the successive reinforcement
over millennia of the dominance of the extrinsic, linguistic, and
abstract over the intrinsic, gestural, and embodied. It's the
story of an unresolved, and never quite equal, contest
between the priorities of the viewer, idealized as an impartial
judge or referee, and those of the maker, viewed somewhat
more skeptically as a partisan, engaged player. To call this
tension a "debate" would be quite misleading since most of the
talking is done by the side that likes to talk. "The work speaks
for itself" is drowned in a sea of guffaws born of received
wisdom. This received wisdom, far from being a knee-jerk
reaction, has incontestably profound cultural roots; it
constitutes a tradition so strong that one takes the part of the
nonverbal artist only at real peril of being laughed out of the
culture profession.
A Baedeker of Western epistemology would take us too far
afield from the topic of art-making. I intend to discuss the
relationship of thought to art-making as opposed to art in
general. Let us concede for the moment that the meaning of
art per se is wholly within the domain of philosophy.
Unfortunately, we can't begin to address the issues raised by
contemporary activist curating without considering its origins
in the history of art-speech. I make no claim that any curator
living or dead has ever consciously heeded any explicit
philosophical mandate or cultural precedent in the course of
mounting a show or building a collection, but I do claim that
such considerations form part of the common ground upon
which all curators build their careers. Some of the components
of this ground also serve the activist curator quite nicely in his
or her quest to become an artist.
The notion that the fundamental act of creation is verbal is as
old as Western civilization. Eight hundred years before the
Evangelist wrote, "In the beginning was the Word,"[5]
Egyptian cosmogony already held that the utterance of a name
was of its own accord an act of creation.[6] Hebraic and
Islamic theologies extended the preference for the word to an
outright prohibition of the graven image. While Plato's
philosophy of ideal forms didn't go so far as to prohibit the
graven image, it did relegate the imitation of nature to the
lowly role of an imitation of an imitation. Aristotle, freed of
Plato's doctrine of forms, tilted the philosophical scales back
somewhat in favor of the dignity of the act of representing
nature qua nature.[7] Toward the end of the Classic period,
Plotinus shifted the focus of the debate again, with great
consequences for the social role of the graven image during
the Christian Middle Ages. Rather than seeing art as simply an
imitation of nature or of an ideal, he maintained that art stood
"at the point where things turn around and go back, where
things return to the starting point on the path to the One and

begin the move toward reintegration."[8] This late pagan
view, which imagines art less as a thing than as a
methodology for attaining spiritual growth, provided a
foundation for the aesthetics of the medieval icon. More to the
Modernist point, when Plotinus urged his readers "to fall down
no longer in bewildered delight before some one embodied
form" but rather "to be led, under a system of mental
discipline, to physical beauty everywhere and made to discern
the One Principle underlying all, a Principle apart from the
material forms,"[9] he pointed the way, however dimly, to
Allan Kaprow.
Plotinus's assertion that the ultimate fate of the art object was
to be sublated into a higher abstraction favors thought, or
more precisely, thought about perception, over unmediated
sensory pleasure.[10] Heraclitus set the tone for this argument
almost a millennium earlier when he maintained that
perception unaided by thought cannot free man from the limits
of his individuality.[11] Plato reinforced the bias for a nonaesthetic reading of the image by making a case for the
similarity of painting and writing.[12] Thus, through an
affinity of dispositions, the expert writer became the expert
viewer. This had profound implications for the culture of the
medieval icon from Byzantium to Italy. The icon conforms at
least as much to literary genres as it does to pictorial
ones.[13] As for the pictorial genres themselves, they had
been reduced to a stock of archetypes subject less to the
caprice of the painter than to the control of the
theologian.[14] Just as the contemporary curator might be
viewed as a priest, the medieval priest might be viewed as a
curator. According to the fourth-century theologian Gregory of
Nyssa, the beauty of an image derives entirely from the
qualities of the abstraction which it attempts to embody, but
when "the higher begins to follow the lower in opposition to
the proper order of things, then the deformity of matter
abandoned by nature reveals itself . . . and that formlessness
also destroys the beauty of nature, which, for its part, received
its beauty from the spirit."[15] Whether an icon was deemed
to be the true image of a saint was determined by church
authorities on the basis of its assumed provenance, miraculous
history, and the political exigencies of competition among rival
monasteries. It was not a commentary on the skill of the
painter or the quality of the graphic composition per se. In a
passage clearly intended to resonate with those who remain
wary of the explicit or implicit denigration of draftsmanship
and painterly craft in much late twentieth-century art, Hans
Belting observed that:
In principle, anything could be consecrated, a fact that
would deny any higher status to images; if they
depended on being consecrated, they relinquished their
power to the consecrating institution. The priest would
then not only be more important than the painters but
also be the true authors of the holiness of the
images.[16]
Rather than literally smashing icons, iconoclasts in the West
have more often preferred to domesticate them under layers
of ecclesiastically vetted interpretation.   At the dawn of the
modern era, Martin Luther reached a compromise between the
Calvinist prohibition of the devotional image and the Roman

Catholic tactic of consecrating and thus fetishizing certain
images. He excluded devotional biblical paintings from his
churches but permitted them to be used in private, with the
understanding that explanatory scriptural mottoes be added to
the images in order to keep them firmly embedded in their
correct theological context.[17] Today, in the curiously private
public space of the contemporary museum show, we're at
home with the remote descendents of Luther's mottoes:
signage—all of that carefully selected information and
circumscribed critique posted by the curator at strategic spots
to help keep our interpretations from becoming too eccentric.
The modern era adds a new wrinkle to the idea-versus-thing
tension implicit in Western culture. An interesting oscillation
begins to manifest itself, often in the same writer, between
two subtly intertwined biases. On the one hand, thought is
assumed to be difficult because it attempts to engage
transcendent universals directly. On the other hand, thought
is assumed to be transcendent and ennobling because it is so
difficult. The fact that persons engaged in the making of
objects are usually oblivious to the charm of this paradoxical
feedback loop is taken as proof that they are operating outside
of it, i.e., at a lower level. Even for an embodied work as
abstract as a lyric poem, one pole of the
difficulty/transcendence oscillation would stipulate that it's
more difficult to analyze the work than to have executed it in
the first place. As Montaigne observed:
Here is a wonder: we have many more poets than
judges and interpreters of poetry. It is easier to create
it than to understand it.[18]
What was a passing note in Montaigne crystallized in Pascal
into an attitude which would hold sway at least through the
Enlightenment: a preference for the universal man over the
lowly worker, whose efforts are channeled into a narrow craft:
Universal men are not called poets or mathematicians,
etc. But they are all these things and judges of them
too.[19]
Pascal was neither naïve nor ironic. In view of the impossibility
of acquiring anything like universal technical competence over
the course of a lifetime, one is forced to interpret Pascal's
description of the universal man as either the promulgation of
a transcendental ideal or a pragmatic exhortation for
developing a unified field theory of criticism that somehow
marginalizes the exigencies of acquiring craft.
Kant takes the very preposterousness of Pascal's
recommendation as one of the central premises of his critique
of judgment:
The reflective Judgment, which is obliged to ascend
from the particular in nature to the universal, requires
on that account a principle that it cannot borrow from
experience, because its function is to establish the unity
of all empirical principles under higher ones, and hence
to establish the possibility of their systematic
subordination.[20]
Making and interpreting do remain distinct in Kant "as a

practical faculty does from a theoretical, as Technic does from
Theory (as mensuration from geometry.")[21] In fact Kant
goes so far as to admonish us not to associate the quality of
beauty with ideas as such:
To speak thus of an intellectual beauty cannot in general
be permissible; for otherwise the word beauty would
lose all determinate significance or the intellectual
satisfaction all superiority over the sensible. We should
rather call a demonstration of such properties beautiful,
because through it the Understanding as the faculty of
concepts, and the Imagination as the faculty of
presenting them, feel themselves strengthened a
priori.[22]
Kant has set a trap for the art maker: the price of restricting
the notion of beauty to its manifestation in nature and art is
that art must then concede the ultimate superiority of
intellectual satisfaction over the merely beautiful. Although
Kant's vocabulary and mode of argument are new, it turns out
that he shares his fundamental premise with the early Church
Fathers that the expert viewer's gaze is superior to the expert
craftsman's hand a priori.
A generation before Kant, this delicate balance between the
perspectives of talker and maker had already been articulated
in less philosophical but no less penetrating terms by the
portraitist and teacher Joshua Reynolds. In an address to the
Royal Academy of Art, which he helped found in 1769,
Reynolds urged apprentice painters to copy the conceptions of
the great masters rather than their touch.
Instead of treading in their footsteps, endeavor only to
keep the same road. Labour to invent on their general
principles and way of thinking. Possess yourself with
their spirit.[23]
While he went so far as to characterize painting as a liberal
art,[24] Reynolds cautioned his students against an excess of
reading that would end up distracting them from the practical
side of their profession. He maintained a fine distinction
between the complexity of an idea that informed a work and
the complexity of its description:
It has been the fate of arts to be enveloped in
mysterious and incomprehensible language, as if it
was thought necessary that even the terms should
correspond to the idea entertained of the instability and
uncertainty of the rules which they expressed.[25]
Both Kant and Reynolds demonstrated a keen appreciation for
the complexity of the praxis-versus-theory tension inherent to
Western art but, not surprisingly, each man ended up in a
rhetorical straddle whose nuance, if not literal argument,
subtly favored his chosen profession.
Hegel's sensitivity to the problem of understanding history,
abetted by his utter incomprehension and impatience with the
art of his time, led him to make a revolutionary move which
resonates today perhaps more forcefully than it did in his own
lifetime to define the maker-versus-interpreter conflict out of
existence:

[T]he conditions of our present time are not favourable
to art. It is not, as might be supposed, merely that the
practising artist himself is infected by the loud voice of
reflection all around him and by the opinions and
judgments on art that have become customary
everywhere, so that he is misled into introducing more
thoughts into his work; the point is that our whole
spiritual culture is of such a kind that he himself stands
within the world of reflection and its relations, and could
not by any act of will and decision abstract himself from
it . . . .
In all these respects art, considered in its highest
vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past.
Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life, and has
rather been transferred into our ideas instead of
maintaining its earlier necessity in reality and occupying
its higher place . . . . The philosophy of art is therefore
a greater need in our day than it was in days when art
by itself as art yielded full satisfaction. Art invites us to
intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose
of creating art again, but for knowing philosophically
what art is.[26]
But even this Hegelian revolution was something of a
consolidation, although Hegel himself seemed oblivious to the
fact that he was merely reinforcing a precedent, that of the
medieval church's sublation of art into theology. The fact that
Hegel sublated art into what he termed ‘science’ rather than
‘religion’ shouldn't distract us from the historical continuity of
his position. It should also not blind us to the fervent case that
Hegel made for art, even as he tried to sublate it out of
existence. Whether the Hegelian argument is complex or
merely inconsistent can be left for the close reader to decide.
In the course of praising the visual arts for their ability to heal
the breach between the universal and the here-and-now,
Hegel denigrated that very same here-and-now as "merely
external, sensuous, and transient."[27] The implications of his
position for the practice of art only become apparent much
later in Hegel's argument against craft. Manner, which
"extends to the execution of the work of art, the handling of
the brush, the laying on of the paint, the blending of colours,
etc.," was for Hegel
the worst thing to which the artist can submit because
in it he indulges simply in his own restricted and
personal whims. But art as such cancels the mere
accidentality of the topic as well as of its external
appearance and therefore demands of the artist that he
shall extinguish in himself the accidental particular
characteristics of his own subjective idiosyncracy.[28]
Hegel came close to conflating the profound union of brain and
hand that constitutes the artist's mind with a mere accident of
the moment. His notion of mind was clearly Cartesian, which
we are apt to overlook since it so closely resembles our own.
The absurd implications of Cartesian absolutism are only now
beginning to be explored by philosophers and cognitive
psychologists.[29] Suffice it to say that Hegel failed to take
into account the implications of the contemporaneous work of
Delacroix, Goya, Constable, Caspar David Friedrich,

Beethoven, and Kleist for his theory. His position resonated,
despite its provincialism, by dint of its audacity: Stop making
art, but do keep talking about it, and call that more highly
evolved activity . . . what? art? philosophy? something else?
One naturally expects philosophers to answer "philosophy"
and artists "art," but conspicuous counterexamples come to
mind immediately: Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Vattimo
among the philosophers; Duchamp and Cage among the
artists. The culture of mid-nineteenth-century France supplied
a third way, a provocative something else: a stylish synthesis
of Kantian aesthetics and Hegel's challenge to raise
commentary to an art form. We know this synthesis today as
flânerie, the art of the hip urban commentator. Constantin
Guys, the Parisian caricaturist and archetypal flâneur
immortalized by Baudelaire in his "Painter of Modern Life,"[30]
was no more a self-conscious neo-Kantian than he was a
student of Hegel, but he worked in a society that was
characterized by its response to Kant and Hegel. We tend to
think of the flâneur as a creature of the boulevards, but he
was equally the child of the museum. The flâneur was the
first species of self-appointed curator. The origins of this
peculiarly French story are worth retelling.
At the dawn of the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie in France,
from the waning days of the ancient régime to the occasion of
Napoleon's second wedding in 1810, the Louvre evolved from
an essentially private collection to a public institution with a
didactic mission no less political than aesthetic. Precedents for
the Louvre existed in Chrétien de Mechel's Imperial Gallery for
the Hapsburgs in Vienna as well as in the first public art
gallery in Paris and the exhibition of royal paintings that had
been installed at the Luxembourg palace in 1750. Whereas the
ideal of the Baroque Kunstkammer in the earlier part of the
century had been to dazzle the eye of the aristocratic guest
with the magnificence of a noble patron's collection, the
Imperial Gallery and the Luxembourg were arranged to tell a
more subtle political story, that of the evolution of the fine art
of painting.[31]
When Charles-Claude de Flahaut, the Comte d'Angiviller, was
commissioned by Louis XVI in 1769 to create a new exhibition
space at the Louvre for the royal collection, the political
program was broadened to enlist the support of a rising
bourgeoisie for the regime whose legitimacy was beginning to
crumble. When Dominique Vivant Denon resumed the project
of reconfiguring the Louvre under Napoleon in 1802, the
legitimizing function of the museum had grown to encompass
the average citizen. Not only did the role of France as Europe's
leading military and cultural power have to be constantly, and
one hoped, suavely, affirmed, but the citizen himself had to be
legitimized as a worthy successor to the landed aristocrat as a
pillar of the state. The publication of Johann Winckelmann's
History of Ancient Art in 1764 may well have served as a
blueprint for the courses of aesthetic education envisioned by
the generation of d'Angiviller and Vivant Denon, but there can
be no doubt that the curator as a creature of the museum was
born of a conflict of interest.
Mounting a visual history of Western art entailed radical
changes in the manner of presenting work, changes that

evolved quickly from the status of expedients to norms.
Uniform top-lighting for works was introduced at considerable
expense in the plans of d'Angiviller for Louis XVI's Louvre. The
nascent profession of curating normalized the practice of
taking visual art out of its functional context, framing it, and
displaying it within a visual cordon sanitaire. A generation
later Hegel ratified this curatorial move by denigrating the
mundane uses of painting as mere decoration. When the
individual work loses its individual social function, it can only
be justified if it helps to tell the story of painting as a
collective endeavor.   In addition to consolidating the
redefinition of the monarchial palace as a public educational
institution, it could be argued that this "new fascination for
exploring the course of art history replaced the old-style
appreciation of the single work of art."[32]
For those not lucky enough to see the Louvre's collection in
person, the museum's catalogs of monochrome engravings
reinforced the illusion of historical inevitability conjured up by
the collection's physical layout, since, as Belting points out, the
reproductions "made different works of art appear more alike
than they actually were."[33] The museum represents Western
culture's most ambitious physical demonstration of the Kantian
injunction to exercise the faculty of judgment. Aside from its
philosophical and political aptness in the wake of French
Revolution, this move had the convenient economic effect of
helping to validate the market for contemporary artists' output.
Now that art was being freed from the caprice of private
aristocratic taste and the dictates of theologs, a canon of the
best work of the past needed to be established, subject to
those norms of social scientific inquiry worthy of an industry.
The continuous struggle to redefine this canon was waged by
scholars in the name of historical accuracy, and by artists for
the purpose of opening a fissure wide enough to sneak their
work in.[34] With the advent of the bourgeois museum and
the rationalization of art collecting, it became impossible not to
engage in this debate, to the extent that the debate itself
competed successfully for the artist's time with the mundane
task of making objects. The merging of the Kantian and the
Hegelian played out in the figure of the Parisian flâneur, who
saw all of society as a virtual museum whose primary value
lay in the quality of observation that it inspired in the sensitive
maven of the streets:
In the flâneur's perceptive vision, what appeared
incoherent and meaningless gained focus and visibility.
He brought alive and invested with significance the
fleeting, everyday occurrences of the city that ordinary
people failed to notice. The flâneur's expert knowledge
of the city involved, however, more complex skills than
systematic and dispassionate observation. It was
accompanied, by all accounts, with a discriminating
taste that allowed him to differentiate genuine quality
from charlatanism in the goods and commodities that he
observed in shop windows. In other words, he brought
to the task of urban flânerie not simply the classifying
skill of the natural scientist, but also the inner sensibility
and moral compass of the sentimental hero.[35]
The spirit of flânerie dates back at least as far as Petronius
and Martial and continues to inform the work of such diverse

artists as Laurie Anderson, Hans Haacke, and Krzysztof
Wodiczko, but it lives on most conspicuously in the projects of
activist curators. Although much has been made about the
provisional nature of the Western concept of an individual work
of art,[36] the Modernist and Postmodernist gazes remain
firmly rooted in the museum, occasionally as a foil for
rebellion, but more often as the only viable template for
synthesizing the interpretative context necessary to
understand an arbitrarily specified object or event as art. We
carry the museum within us.[37]
As Mary Gluck observes, the flâneur exposes the epic
possibilities of the banal.[38] Two emblematic events in the
tense period leading up to the Great War pointed to a serious
realignment in art's relationship to the banal. The exhibition
of Marcel Duchamp's first readymade, Bicycle Wheel (1913),
brought flânerie out of the street into the museum. A year
earlier, the carnivalesque brouhaha that attended the theft of
the Mona Lisa from the Louvre had already demonstrated the
extent to which the banalization of the contents of the
museum had advanced in the popular imagination:
[I]n the 1912 Mardi Gras procession, the stolen Mona
Lisa took to the skies in an aeroplane. Postcards
showed her calling out of a train window that she
wanted to return to the Louvre.[39]
Duchamp's signing of an altered postcard reproduction of the
Mona Lisa in 1919 as a readymade can best be understood as
a gesture of affirmation: the public grant of an artist's
imprimatur to the flâneur's canny recognition of an unnoticed
shift in the sensibility of the streets.
There are three major consequences of preferring the
interpretation of the beautiful to the act of embodying the
beautiful in an object or performance. First, it explicitly
denigrates less mediated, more ecstatic responses to art.
Second, it tends to underestimate the difficulty of a specific
craft's technical problems, as well as the potential of those
problems to inspire works. Third, it becomes increasingly
difficult, as verbalization builds upon on verbalization, to resist
a dangerous and intellectually dishonest tendency to argue
from the specifics of one art form while applying conclusions
across the board to all of those activities which we now know
as "art," be they mimetic, non-mimetic, concerned with the
making of flat objects, three-dimensional objects, the telling of
stories, or the staging of performances.
When Arthur Danto and Donald Kuspit write about the end of
a certain Euro-American tradition of painting and sculpture
and refer to it as the "end of art,"[40] they are continuing the
same rhetorical game that the Socratic philosophers kicked off
when they synthesized an ontology of aesthetics from selective
observations about sculpture, drama, and music without
paying heed to the profoundly different materials and
procedures of those activities.[41] A general theory of beauty
was deemed more important than a specific knowledge of
craft, even when the specific details of a craft were used to
build the general theory. As Kant remarked, "it is not the
object of sense, but the use which the Judgment naturally
makes of certain objects on behalf of this latter feeling, that is
absolutely great."[42] Gianni Vattimo noted that Kant's point

of view holds that "what is pleasing in aesthetic experience is
neither the object nor the individual's subjectivity, but rather
its very communicability."[43] The curator works within the
fertile, contested ground where the object, the individual's
subjectivity, the artisan's mastery of materials, and the issue
of communicability intersect.
3. The Habitus of the Contemporary Curator
The sheer garrulousness of Western aesthetics
notwithstanding, one needs to remember that the polemics of
art existed as sort of disembodied reaction to the mute,
overwhelming force of a prevailing physical culture of the craft
of making things, a physical culture that answered primarily to
the exigencies of technic and only tangentially to those of
theory. The curator stands equally rooted in the culture of the
object and the culture of the word. Contradictions are
inevitable in such a straddling act, and these contradictions
shape the habitus of both the custodial and the activist
curator. Indeed, it is the individual curator's response to a
small set of key problems stemming from the maker-viewer
gap that will lead him or her to adopt a more custodial
attitude in one show and a more activist posture in another.
Not surprisingly, activist curating turns out to be at least as
intricately bound to history as custodial curating. The act of
redefining a curator as a creator first and cultural custodian
only by implication is still a project undertaken within the
context of the layperson's precisely opposite expectation. No
one is more sensitively attuned to the potential for
contradiction, misunderstanding, and dissimulation in this
regard than the activist curator, the more so since the dangers
go largely unnoticed by the general public.
As if the praxis-theory dialectic weren't enough of a challenge
for curators in their role as educators, the very nature of the
theories to be embodied in shows is actually much more
unstable than a typical glossy catalogue essay would have one
believe. There is a clear difference between the difficulty of
demonstrating the value of a previously established canon, on
the one hand, and the difficulty of making a case for the
museum quality of new works, on the other, to say nothing of
making a case for new ideas about the very nature of the
project of art. The nature of the power wielded by a curator in
a given show and, hence, the complexion of that curator's
educational function, varies with the type of theory being
imparted. I shall return to the paradoxical nature of wellintentioned teaching later in this essay.
The modern curator, whether of a custodial or activist bent, is
typically an expert in many fields: history, conservation,
administration, and the production of shows, to cite but the
obvious. Conversely, a large segment of the art-making
community, following the lead of three generations of art
thinkers, from Duchamp through Cage to Warhol and Allan
Kaprow, has embraced the notion that skill in any narrow
tradition of art-making is irrelevant and possibly an obstacle to
the realization of ideational art. This partial consensus,
abetted by the trend after 1945 to train painters in
universities,[44] made for strange bedfellows. Who can top
the irony of Clement Greenberg, pope of abstract expressionist
rigor, anticipating the position of Arthur Danto, fetishizer of

ersatz Brillo boxes?
[W]hat is the ultimate source of value or quality in art?
. . . [T]he worked-out answer appears to be: not skill,
training, or anything else having to do with execution or
performance, but conception alone. Culture or taste may
be a necessary condition of conception, but conception
alone is decisive.[45]
The last thirty years of the twentieth century were
distinguished by a cacophony of cross disciplinary theorizing,
whose primary characteristic, aside from a persistent
millenarianism, was its enthusiastic preference for rhetorical
collage and mixed metaphor over linear argument: Derrida
punning his way into epistemological dilemmas; Deleuze and
Guattari playing fast and loose with mathematics; and just
about everybody applying vaguely understood principles of
textual deconstruction to apples and oranges. At least
anecdotally, "it appeared as if the cultural energies that had
fueled the art movements of the 1960s were flowing during
the 1970s into the body of theory, leaving the artistic
enterprise high and dry."[46] It was no accident that the
influence of Harald Szeemann's Großausstellungen ("great
exhibitions")[47] increased spectacularly from the 1970s
onward.[48]
Just as nature abhors a vacuum and the thinker abhors a
deficit of intelligent debate, it turns out that the audience for
the plastic arts abhors a deficit of craft. In a moment of
desperation, a perceived deficit of physical craft may be
compensated for by well-argued essays in lavishly illustrated
exhibition catalogs. If the artist refuses to dazzle the viewer
with a deft technique that overcomes the expected limitations
of an unforgiving medium, then it's left to the curator, as the
organizer of Kantian demonstrations of the sublime, to step
into the breach and address the deficit of wonderment. Is this
possible without becoming, in the vernacular sense of the
word, an artist? What are the implications of proxying for the
artist while maintaining the posture of referee in the art
game? As Canetti observed, the cultural critic aspires to
emulate the medicine man, who undergoes a ritual death to
his culture in order to return as a more acute observer of
it.[49] To the extent that the curator wishes to get his or her
hands dirty as an artist, this possibility of floating above the
fray as a disinterested observer is comparably reduced.
The modern curator is torn between the contradictory
injunctions of the Enlightenment to make demonstrations of
the beautiful, on the one hand, and to acknowledge the
sublation of art into philosophy, on the other. The curator of
contemporary art who wishes to soar freely above the roiling
ocean of contending egos that constitutes the international art
market finds him- or herself instead becalmed in a sea of new
work that denies, often without a shred of irony, the very
concept of the work. In denying the work, an artist denies
"the qualities that characterized painting and sculpture—
autonomy, form, authorship and originality."[50] The curator
who acquiesces in the derogation of these qualities by the
artist is confronted with a stark choice: either supply these
qualities in the conception and execution of programmatic
Großausstellungen, and thus become an artist; or accept their

absence as the fait accompli attending a radical redefinition of
the curator into an archivist or anthropologist of exceedingly
narrow range.
Curators create physical manifestations of analytic theories
formulated primarily by critics. And late twentieth-century
criticism, by insisting on the superior creative nature of
interpretation relative to the largely de-skilled output of
contemporary plastic and conceptual artists, has made it
difficult, if not impossible, for curators to resist the urge to
redefine themselves as artists in their own right. In her 1979
survey of the expanded horizon of sculpture, Rosalind Krauss
stated the strong position of modern criticism succinctly: "For,
within the situation of postmodernism, practice is not defined
in relation to a given medium—sculpture―but rather in relation
to the logical operations on a set of cultural terms, for which
any medium—photography, books, lines on walls, mirrors, or
sculpture itself―might be used."[51]
Arthur Danto takes this position even further by arguing that
the commentator is the only person in our culture who can
quote with integrity, "In saying that all forms are ours, then, I
want to distinguish between their use and their mention."[52]
In other words, the art critic is free to roam the history of
Western art, mentioning precedents at will, seeking
illustrations and analytical conceits wherever they can be
found, but the art maker cheapens him- or herself by quoting
stylistically. Since it's impossible to sustain a tradition of artmaking without referring to historical precedents and equally
impossible to participate in the Postmodern aesthetic without
referring to other work done in our time, the field of creation
in the arts is left to the critic and the critic's proxies. Curators
who ally themselves with this position cut themselves off from
dialogue with the makers of concrete art.
The post-Hegelian program for sublated art, like any ideology,
wills its own blindness. In his analysis of modern European
fiction, Karl Heinz Bohrer shows how the self-understanding of
creative writers was never more acute than in the century
following Hegel. The same could be said for plastic artists in
the century between Delacroix and Picasso. Not only was art
not the handmaiden of the unified field theorizing of art
philosophers but, beginning with Duchamp and continuing with
increasing persuasiveness through the twentieth century, it
could be said that art successfully challenged philosophy as a
mediator of meaning. As Bohrer concluded, "philosophy lost
relevance while art gained significance."[53] In the society of
the spectacle, who in the end can distinguish with confidence
between the Aufhebung of art into philosophy and its reversal:
the Niederholung of philosophy into art?[54] The question is
too abstract for even the most talented curator to demonstrate
in an exhibition; nevertheless, the impossibility of its resolution
lurks behind every practical decision that's made in the course
of mounting any show of contemporary art. Staying the
course in such tricky waters requires irrational optimism. The
effort of will required to maintain such optimism is not unlike
that required of an artist. Indeed, very little separates
Nietzsche's Ur-critic, his theoretical man,[55] from his
superman:
No longer the artist, [man] has himself become a work

of art: the productive power of the whole universe is
now manifest in his transport, to the glorious
satisfaction of the primordial One.[56]
One hopes that educator-curators will see themselves more as
teachers than as Nietzschean works of art incarnate, but a
paradox lurks even in the modesty of a teacher. The scholarly
educator may seem humbler than the self-aggrandizing artist,
but it's important to remember that pedagogy is also
grounded in power: the power to divide intelligence into a
lower order (the empirical world of the child, the student, and
the laborer) and a higher order (the rational, categorizing,
system-building world of the adult, the teacher, and the
administrator). The skill of the teacher that allows him or her
to transmit knowledge by adapting it to the partially formed
intellectual capacities of the student is taken as sufficient proof
of the superiority of the knowledge and attitudes being
imparted. The fact that the atmosphere of the classroom robs
much of the material taught there of its savor, except for the
teacher's pets who've already bought into its culture of
enforced stultification, doesn't discourage the committed
educator. The master teacher may be highly self-critical, but
he is also proud enough of his calling to reject caricatures of
the pedagogue cramming students' heads full of received
wisdom. As Jacques Rancière points out in his study of
educational experiments in nineteenth-century France, the
well-intentioned master teacher confirms students' sense of
their inferiority in the very act of transmitting knowledge. The
teacher is:
. . . all the more efficacious because he is
knowledgeable, enlightened, and of good faith. The
more he knows, the more evident to him is the distance
between his knowledge and the ignorance of the
ignorant ones. The more he is enlightened, the more
evident he finds the difference between groping blindly
and searching methodically, the more he will insist on
substituting the spirit for the letter, the clarity of
explications, for the authority of the book.[57]
Lesson number one of the master teacher is that the student
shouldn't presume to read the book without the teacher's
guidance. Rancière, in a stunning, counter-intuitive move, sees
this as ideological conditioning rather than the encouragement
of critical thought. Insofar as the lay audience thinks of the
museum, the large commercial gallery, or the art fair as a
giant classroom, the curator has to invent tactics for resisting
a tendency toward the enforced stultification of the work on
exhibit. To the extent that the curator succeeds in coming up
with innovative solutions to the problem of seducing the
viewer into an appreciation of one or another art theory du
jour, the curator makes common cause with the teacher who
succeeds in detoxifying the power structure of the school.
Pedagogy is never pure, even for the pure of heart. This
applies equally to a curator operating in the most apparently
non-interventionist, custodial manner. This is, in fact, the crux
of Rancière's rather cruel point.
Before leaving the subject of the curator as educator, we need
to consider how it merges with the role of modern flâneur.
The activist curator is not only an organizer of illustrative

exhibitions; he or she is, like the nineteenth-century flâneur,
an active recontextualizer of human artifacts into interpretative
frameworks. The authority to recontextualize has many
sources, but as Gluck points out in her study of Parisian
flânerie, “Behind the impeccably groomed and anonymous
public façade of the flâneur, there lay concealed the private
face of the professional man of letters.”[58] There's always
been more than a whiff of slumming in the flâneur's
relationship to his sources on the street. Can the curator who
is immersed in the art of the time escape a similar dilemma?
Does the dispassion that allows you to recontextualize the
tussles of rival gangs hopelessly taint your street cred?
Philosophical and methodological paradoxes notwithstanding,
the curator remains a figure of considerable power, one of the
principal actors, along with critics and collectors, in the
continual process of redefining the canon of art. The curator
may not imagine him- or herself to be powerful any more than
the Williamsburg gallerist imagines he or she is part of The
Academy; like most powerful people of good will, the curator is
uncomfortable with the consequences of calling the plays in a
zero-sum game. For every painter whose work is validated in a
retrospective show, another artist's oeuvre will be tossed onto
the invisible rubbish heap of failed vanity projects. Ever the
astute observer, Canetti identified a strong undertow of
Schadenfreude in the project of maintaining an artistic canon.
The person who pronounces a painting to be "bad" wants this
statement to sound objective, but has trouble resisting the
implication, made clear in the thinly disguised pleasure with
which the verdict is delivered, that "bad" work is done by
"bad" minds:
In what does this pleasure consist? It consists in
relegating something to an inferior group, while
presupposing a higher group to which we ourselves
belong. We exalt ourselves by abasing others.[59]
The degree of anonymity under which curators work may be a
source of career frustration, but it's also a source of power.
The curator who is not also a practicing critic typically works
silently in the bowels of a great institution. No one really
knows how curators go about their business. As Canetti
observed, "secrecy lies at the very core of power."[60] The
artist awaits the next big exhibition's realignment of the art
universe, and his or her relative conjunction or disjunction
with it. A verdict is delivered, perhaps provisional, but
nonetheless a judgment, while the curator returns to the
hidden precincts where the next essay in canon formation will
be conceived. The artist appears helpless in the face of such a
dynamic, but social dialogue is seldom so simple. As Canetti
emphasized at the very beginning of his critique of power,
"There is nothing that man fears more than the touch of the
unknown."[61] In other words, I can create your power over
me simply by willfully keeping myself in the dark, by failing to
ask you what you do, for fear . . . for fear of what? of being
touched? of discovering that you the curator know more
about my profession than I the artist? Whatever the answer,
it should be clear that curatorial power need not spring from a
power trip on the part of curators.
But it may. As the activist curator approaches the status of an

auteur of exhibitions, to what extent can he or she remain
immune to conflicts of interest? One expects Darwinian
struggles among emerging artists, but the erudition and
relative anonymity of curators has tended to shield them from
scrutiny on this score. If such struggles were waged solely on
the level of aesthetics, they would be complex enough, but it's
quite clear that they're also bound to economics and the
construction of social hierarchies. By virtue of his or her role
as recontextualizer of the canon, the curator influences the
development of art on two distinctly unaesthetic planes: in its
role as an alternative asset class for highly capitalized
investors, and in its function as a marker of social rank. The
intersection of these two planes can be seen in Bernard
Berenson's discreet relationship with the art dealer Joseph
Duveen, where Berenson helped to close sales by furnishing
expert corroboration of the canonic status of previously
obscure paintings. The service provided by Berenson was
scarcely different from the corporate credit-worthiness
rankings issued today by Moody's. In both cases, wellresearched, supposedly disinterested advice was offered for
the related purposes of bolstering the confidence of a skittish
buyer and stabilizing the overall workings of a market that
continually needed to prove to skeptics that it could be, and
indeed was, rational.
Of course, this analogy upsets the sensibilities of the pure
aestheticians among us: critics, curators, artists, collectors,
and casual viewers alike. We act as if art-making and
interpretation sprang from a zone of pure contemplation
unpolluted by the culture of buying, selling, and jockeying for
status. The commonly held, naïve, and hence inexpressible
attitude runs something like this: Art work may be sullied in
the exchange economy, but at least its conception ought to
remain immaculate. No one really believes in the Immaculate
Conception anymore, but a world religion still revolves around
it. Warhol put a dent in the consensus with his ingenious
conflation of Duchamp and the ad agency, but in spite of his
abiding attraction for the anti-establishment critical
establishment, he remains for many art makers today a
footnote, at best, the exception who proved the rule. Hip
postures notwithstanding, our culture of pervasive irony still
clings to just enough of the foundation myths of Romanticism
to remain in a state of queasy denial about the sociallyconstructed, non-artistic foundation of art values.  
The recontextualizing power of museum culture is still strong
enough that it absorbs virtually all of the overt political and
social commentary that artists presume to introduce. Explicit
politics are detoxified within the cordon sanitaire of aesthetic
discourse. One might question this assertion with any number
of fair counter-examples: What about feminist art? What
about gay agit-prop? What about Socialist Realism? The
answer is that all of the overt political agendas of such work,
sincere as they might be, are embedded in a more profound
political context that subverts their surface content. "Political"
work is political, just not in the way it was intended. The more
overtly "political" the show, the more ironically, and
definitively, will the dynamics of depoliticized
recontextualization be reinforced.
Consider Wack!, the recent retrospective exhibition of feminist

art organized by Cornelia Butler for the Los Angeles Museum
of Contemporary Art.[62] The show spans four decades and
includes hundreds of works by over a hundred artists. It
includes pieces executed in a stupefying variety of techniques:
painting, sculpture, photomontage, collage, essays, litanies,
music, body art, videos, verbal documentation of
performances, and installations. The technical level of
execution ranges from the simply or purposefully crude to a
technically brilliant mastery of traditional idioms. It's
impossible in a three-hour circuit of the many galleries that
comprise the exhibition to pay more than cursory attention to
the political message of each piece. Meanwhile, the viewer is
overwhelmed with the task of readjusting her mode of
perception to fit the requirements of each piece's mode of
execution: Should I be looking here at painterly qualities?
Should I be ignoring the visual appearance altogether in favor
of a literal or implied verbal script? Should I take the
elements of this collage as documentation, elements of an
extended metaphor, or noise? Does the artist assume that I
will read these two thousand words of densely packed pencil
script? Was the roughness of this documented performance a
withering comment on the slickness of other performances or
merely an indication that painters often underestimate the
difficulty of shaping time?
One assumes that Butler conceived the exhibition as more
than a series of semi-opaque moments. One assumes that the
political content was supposed to do more than corroborate
received opinion. For this to happen, the viewer must supply
a subtle and supple integrative conceit, a notion of art open
enough to encompass radically different modes of execution
while remaining sufficiently well-bounded to unite all of this
effort under a rubric that will elevate it above poster-making
and blogging. It is the artists and curators who've decided to
consecrate the work in the show as art, but it is the viewer
who picks up the tab, metaphysically speaking. Meanwhile it's
the artist and curator who stand to benefit professionally from
the success of any show that tacitly or explicitly acknowledges
the primacy of the gallery system. It follows that there are
two overt, readily acknowledged, and contradictory political
aspects to the Wack! show: its explicit feminist critique of
society on the one hand; and its radically compromised
expectation, necessary for any professional, that the viewer
will bestow a sympathetic reading on what's essentially a
careerist enterprise, granting it a transcendental authority that
could only proceed from the very same ideology of Western art
that many of the works in the show attempt to subvert.
The Wack! show is not unique in this regard.[63] I cite it here
because it is an outstanding exhibition, a well-conceived
presentation of powerful work. Its quality helps to conceal its
true socio-political content, which it shares with the
ministrations of all priesthoods, and which I would describe
roughly as follows: It is acknowledged, though not often
discussed in polite company until the third drink, that the arts
are defined by the same Darwinian savagery as any another
profession. It is also acknowledged that the aspiration of art to
beauty and truth is a pious fiction, but in the best possible
sense of the word. Finally, and crucially, it's acknowledged
that these two characteristics of art are seriously and
permanently at odds with one another. The fundamental

politics of art revolve around the struggle to suppress this
tension, to render it invisible, to declare it unproductive. This
is meta-politics of the highest order: the struggle to suppress
an acute understanding of a struggle. Freud would be
comfortable in these precincts. The struggle to suppress or
suspend an understanding of the competing motivations for
art-making is fundamental, because it assumes a priori that
the pollution of aesthetics by social pressure would be bad for
art, when in fact it's not even clear that they've ever been
distinct.[64]
The practical ramifications of this submerged debate are
enormous and varied. The art world has been in a state of
denial over its internal contradictions for so long that it's
developed the capacity to deny just about anything and
support any contradiction. Practice makes perfect. Donald
Kuspit cites Marcel Duchamp as an art-philosophical
godfather,[65] and then denigrates him as a charlatan in his
next book.[66] Arthur Danto publishes theories of the end of
Western art while continuing to review it, ultimately issuing
jesuitical explanations of how the end of Western art doesn't
necessarily imply the end of art-making by artists in the West.
The New York art world listened carefully when Jean
Baudrillard accused the entire Euro-American art profession of
perpetrating a massive fraud:
It is necessary to distinguish clearly between . . . the
moment of heroic simulacrum, so to speak, when art
experiences and expresses its own disappearance, and
the moment when it has to manage this disappearance
as a sort of negative heritage. The first moment is
original, it only happens once, even if it lasted for
decades from the 19th to the 20th centuries, but it is no
longer original, and I think we are involved in this
second moment, in this surpassed disappearance, in this
surpassed simulation, surpassed in the sense of an
irreversible coma.[67]
It then proceeded to act as if absolutely nothing had been said
—no offense taken! Into this fray steps the curator, who has
to decide before each new show which aspect of art's schizoid
denial of its manifest contradictions to avoid this time. No
matter how the curator decides, he or she can expect to be
excoriated as a meddler, dismissed as naïve, or both. Robert
Storr's attempt in the 2007 Venice Biennale to reopen debate
on the theory-versus-praxis tension implicit in contemporary
art encountered just this type of facile rejection.[68]
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu built his career on
successively more nuanced analyses of the function of the high
arts as an enabling mechanism for the maintenance of class
distinctions.[69]   Writing as a politically engaged sociologist,
he saw the growth of the importance of the curator as a
consequence of increasingly frequent and elaborate
celebrations of art, which "all combine to favour the
establishment of an unprecedented relationship between the
body of interpreters and the work of art, analogous to that
found in the great esoteric traditions."   In a clear reference to
activist curators, he added that "one has to be blind not to see
that discourse about a work is not a mere accompaniment,
intended to assist its perception and appreciation, but a stage

in the production of the work, of its meaning and value."[70]
Although Bourdieu could usually see connections across
disciplines, one boundary proved to be insuperable, even for
him. Bourdieu talked about economics, politics, sociology, and
education on their own terms, and he related the arts to all of
them, but he stopped short of doing art the reciprocal favor of
talking about art qua art. Had he done so, he could have
proceeded to the final stage implied by his analysis. After
examining the internal evolutionary dynamics of art on its own
terms, in contradistinction to the internal dynamics of socially
constructed value and class tension on their own terms, he
could have explored how these nominally separate systems
interpenetrate each other, modify their respective evolutionary
trends in unexpected ways, and generally thicken each others'
plots.[71] Bourdieu is the mirror image of the artist, critic, or
curator who knows damn well that the plastic arts are a
dynamic confluence of visual aesthetics, craft, literary
aesthetics, philosophy, trendspotting, proselytizing, and social
climbing, but who persists in bracketing off the polluting social
elements. For Bourdieu the social scientist, the polluting
element that had to be bracketed—treated in his analysis as if
it were a black box, if not a Brillo box—was art. Art's revenge
was that, in the years since Bourdieu's death, the paradigm of
art curating has invaded every nook and cranny of
postindustrial society.   Clearly, the issues raised by the
bureaucratization of the aesthetics of what used to be known
as the visual arts still await a definitive study. The
multitasking curator in the regime of incorporated aesthetics
navigates a social matrix unknown to the Enlightenment
philosopher of art.
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